From 2017 to earlier this year, Emerging Market (EM) equities had been bolstered by the consensus optimism on a strong and synchronized global growth. However, this did not materialize – instead, economic growth moderated in many developed and emerging market economies outside of exceptionalism in US, hurting investor sentiment on EM along with other risk assets. In addition, elections across both developed (Italy and Spain) and emerging markets (Russia, Turkey, Indonesia and upcoming in Brazil) have created uncertainty around political outcomes, we believe thus sparking bouts of market volatility and weighing on EM equities. Compounding this has been the escalating geopolitical uncertainty and macro implications of further US tariffs on Chinese exports. In our opinion, the EM sell-off was further exacerbated by country-specific weaknesses such as US sanctions on Russia, as well as external funding concerns for Turkey and Argentina.
We believe these country-specific drivers warrant only isolated weaknesses rather than the broad-based sell-off we have recently seen, as EM remains a heterogeneous asset class. The fundamental impact of trade and idiosyncratic risks to broader EM growth and equities should be limited in our opinion, although we are alert to second-round impacts on investments and business confidence, as well as short-term contagions from negative sentiment. For example, Turkey comprises only 5% of EM GDP on a trade-weighted basis1, and 0.6% of the MSCI index2. Argentina is only 1% of EM trade-weighted GDP1, and is currently classified as a frontier market and is expected to have weight of 0.4% upon its inclusion in the MSCI EM index in August 2019. In addition, EM remains a largely domestic-facing universe, where many countries are somewhat insulated from escalating trade tensions and EM companies in aggregate only derive 8% of their total revenue from the US2. China remains a large component of the EM economy and equity market (50% of trade-weighted EM GDP1 and 31% of MSCI EM2), but the direct economic impact of the latest US tariffs to China’s $13 trillion GDP would be approximately only 0.5% even if export volumes fell by twice the amount of the 25% tariff3, and we expect supportive domestic policy to somewhat offset the risks from trade.